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Abstract 
 
Research into corporate governance has shown that there are a number of factors that influence company 
performance, one of them being ownership structure. The objective of this study is to determine how 
ownership structure affects the performance of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE). Five categories of shareholders were identified namely, managerial shareholders, institutional 
investors, family shareholders, government shareholders and foreign shareholders. Some shareholders 
of a company may be entirely passive whereas others may play a more active role in the company or 
perform an important monitoring service. The various motivations and abilities of the different types of 
shareholders may directly impact their ability to influence the major corporate decisions of the company 
that will ultimately impact the performance of the company. Using return on assets (ROA) and return 
on equity (ROE) as performance measures this study investigates the effect of ownership structure on 
the performance of 143 companies from the year 2004 to 2014. The results of the study reveal that of 
the five different categories of shareholders identified it was only managerial shareholders and 
institutional shareholders that had a significant impact on a company’s performance 
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Chapter 1 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Over many years the issue of corporate governance and ownership structure (which is a mechanism of 
corporate governance) has become a highly discussed topic in business and finance due to the balance 
sheet manipulation and collapse of public corporations such as Enron and WorldCom.  Since these 
events corporate governance has undergone various changes such as the introduction of King III report 
(Agyei and Owusu, 2014). 
The corporate governance system is considered by many to be one of the essential factors of growth 
and development for a company. Fazlzadeh, Hendi and Mahboubi (2011) noted that corporate 
governance is a philosophy and mechanism that helps facilitate the creation of shareholder value. It 
does this through the management of corporate affairs in a way that ensures that individuals and 
collective stakeholders are protected. Research into corporate governance has shown that there are a 
number of factors that influence corporate governance, one of them being ownership structure. 
 
Some shareholders of a company may be entirely passive whereas others may play a more active role 
in the company or perform an important monitoring service. The various motivations and abilities of 
the different types of shareholders may directly impact their ability to influence the major corporate 
decisions of the company that will ultimately impact the performance of the company (Serdar Karaca 
and Ekşi, 2012). 
 
Research into ownership structure and performance has however focused primarily on companies in 
developed economies like the US and Europe. There has not been much research conducted in the 
context of emerging economies, more specifically South Africa. Using return on assets (ROA) and 
return on equity (ROE) as performance measures the objective of this study is to determine whether the 
ownership structure affects the performance of companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE). In order to do this, the performance and ownership structure of JSE listed companies over the 
period 2004 to 2014 was analysed. 
1.2 Statement of problem 
 
The ownership structure of a firm and its impact on the performance is a topic that has been researched 
for quite a number of years. The fundamental insight into this relationship dates back to Berle and 
Means (1932), who argued that the separation of ownership and control of modern corporations reduces 
any incentive that managers have to ensure that the firm is run efficiently.  
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Their concerns were further supported by Jensen and Meckling (1976) who developed the agency 
theory. The central premise of their theory is that self-interested managers (agents) may engage in 
decision making behaviour that may be inconsistent with the maximisation of value for shareholders.  
 
As mentioned above, Berle and Means (1932) were among the first to investigate the impact ownership 
structure has on performance. They noted that performance is inversely affected as the ownership 
structure of a company becomes more diverse. They asserted that the growing diversification of 
ownership results in the shareholders losing their power to control management. While legally those 
shareholders may own the company they may not feel a sense of ownership or control over the firm as 
their stake in the company is small. They thus concluded that a negative correlation exists between 
ownership concentration and a firm’s performance (Serdar et al., 2012 and Fazlzadeh et al., 2011). 
 
On the other hand having concentrated ownership has been widely acknowledged to provide incentives 
for large shareholders to play a role in monitoring the decisions of management and ensure that the 
managers do not make any decisions that may be detrimental to the company. As the holding of these 
large investors increases they have a greater incentive to increase firm performance and to monitor 
management more than dispersed shareholders. The down side is that their presence reduces the 
liquidity of the stock whereas with widely dispersed ownership liquidity is enhanced. Furthermore 
because of their controlling position, there is the danger that these shareholders will use their power to 
extract private benefits at the expense of the smaller shareholders (Fazlzadeh et al., 2011). 
 
Ownership identity  
There are generally two main aspects of ownership structure, namely ownership concentration and 
identity of those owners. Ownership concentration is often defined as the proportion of a company’s 
shares that are held by a number of shareholders and it is measured by percentage of shares that are held 
by the first largest or first five largest shareholders (De Jong, 2002). The focus of this study is one the 
ownership identity.  
 
The effect ownership identity has on firm performance is based on the idea that each of the shareholders 
have different motivations, goals and abilities, all of which may directly impact their ability to influence 
the major corporate decisions of the company that will ultimately affect the company’s performance. A 
review of literature reveals that prior research has focused mainly on the conventional separation of 
ownership and control, i.e. whether insider ownership or block holding has an impact on financial 
performance. Under these studies the researchers have assumed that all the shareholders are 
homogeneous. This assumption was challenged by Kang and Sorensen (1999) as cited in Reddy, Abidin 
et al (2013) who argued that shareholders cannot be considered homogenous as they all have different 
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motivations and strategic goals. For example, larger shareholders (which may include institutional 
investors) may have superior knowledge and resources as compared to your retail investors, which 
allows them to be better than your retail investors at monitoring the actions of management. Thus 
depending on the specific characteristics of the shareholder (example their goals, knowledge of the 
company etc.) their level of involvement and influence on performance will differ.  
 
1.3 Purpose of study 
The goal of this study is to understand whether the ownership structure affects the performance of 
companies listed on the JSE. While research into ownership structure and performance has however 
focused primarily on companies in developed economies like the US and Europe. There has not been 
much research conducted in the context of emerging economies, more specifically South Africa. Thus 
the findings in this paper will help improve our understanding of the impact that shareholder diversity 
has on the performance of JSE listed companies. 
1.4 Research question 
The research question that this paper will look to answer is: 
 Does the ownership structure of JSE-Listed companies impact their performance? 
1.5 Delimitations 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) shareholders 
BEE shareholders have been excluded simply due to the fact that not all companies provide information 
regarding their BEE shareholders. Secondly in order to get an accurate account of the percentage of 
shares held by the BEE shareholder the BEE scorecards of the company would need to be obtained for 
the entire period under review, which has proved to be difficult.  
While the financial statements of a company often provide information regarding the shareholding, not 
all companies publish this information (more specifically information relating to BEE shareholders), 
which again made it difficult to obtain the relevant data. 
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Chapter 2: Background 
2.1 Literature review 
As part of the review of literature on this topic the researcher has identified five categories of 
shareholders, namely managerial shareholders, institutional investors, government shareholders, family 
shareholders and foreign shareholders. In this chapter the background into these different shareholders 
and their impact on the performance of the company will be discussed. 
2.1.1 Managerial shareholders and performance 
Up until the 1980’s the main focus of corporate governance literature was on the conflict that existed 
between shareholders and managers. It has been widely accepted that the ownership concentration of a 
company does have the potential to limit the agency conflict and lead to improved performance (Hu 
and Izumida, 2009). 
As managers of a company hold more shares in the company, it assists in aligning their interests with 
those of the shareholders. This aligning of interests and the relationship between managerial ownership 
and corporate value was formalized by Jensen and Meckling (1976). They propose that managerial 
ownership has a positive effect on performance as it aligns the incentives of managers with those of the 
shareholder, thereby reducing the agency problem. The higher the level of managerial ownership the 
greater the probability that management will devote a significant amount of time and effort to maximize 
firm value and performance as that will ultimately be beneficial for them as well (Hu and Izumida, 
2009). 
One significant study that was conducted to evaluate this relationship was done by Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988). This study looked at director shareholding as a measure of ownership concentration 
against Tobin Q and accounting profit as measures of performance for 500 fortune companies. To 
capture this relationship, they categorized the managerial shareholding into three different levels: 0%-
5%; 5%-25%; and beyond 25%. The results reveal that there is a positive relationship between 
managerial shareholding and firm value when the percentage shares held by management were between 
0% and 5%. This was attributed to the fact that the increase in the number of shares held by the manager 
led to the alignment of interests between the shareholders and management. This is known as the 
incentive alignment argument. As management now has a financial interest in the company there is a 
greater incentive for them to ensure that the company operates to the benefit of the shareholders as any 
positive performance that the company experiences will benefit them as well. When managerial 
shareholding was between 5% and 25% a negative relationship was found. The researchers concluded 
that the negative relationship was as a result of managers becoming complacent and no-longer putting 
in the required amount of effort to ensure the continued growth of the firm. However at higher levels 
of ownership (managerial shareholding being more than 25%) the relationship (though not significant) 
becomes positive again as the manager now has a greater financial interest in the company. 
9 
 
In explaining the negative relationship found when managerial shareholding was between 5% and 25%, 
the researcher’s also used the entrenchment argument. The entrenchment argument states that as the 
number of shares held by management increases there is a decrease in performance. The managers in 
the firm become so powerful that they no longer need to consider the other shareholders. As a result of 
having greater power, they have greater freedom to pursue their own interests. The managers are able 
to divert funds away from the company through theft; dilution of outside investor interest by issuing 
shares; paying themselves excessive salaries or even selling of assets to themselves or other firms which 
they control at favourable prices (Scholten 2014). 
While these two arguments around the entrenchment and incentive alignment may be at opposite ends 
they can be taken together. The results found in the study suggests that the incentive alignment is more 
important at both low and high levels of managerial ownership and that entrenchment takes place at 
medium levels of ownership (Scholten, 2014). 
 
2.1.2 Institutional investors and performance 
Over the years institutional investors have become increasingly willing to use their ownership rights to 
ensure that management act in the best interest of the shareholders. As a result researchers have become 
increasingly interested in analysing the role they play in the company (Salehi, Hematfar and Heydari, 
2011; Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Tehranian, 2007) 
 
Institutional investors can be defined as specialized financial institutions that manage 
savings/contributions on behalf of other investors towards a specific objective. The types of institutional 
investors include pension funds, life insurance companies, and different forms of mutual funds. (Salehi 
et al., 2011). 
 
A considerable amount of research has been conducted focusing on the role that these investors play as 
corporate monitors. A hypothesis that has come out of the research is the efficient monitoring 
hypothesis, which contends that the larger the shareholding of these investors the more efficient 
monitoring that is exerted by the investor, which increases the probability of success and positive firm 
performance (Salehi et al., 2011). 
 
The institutional investors are more efficient at monitoring the actions of management as they generally 
have the resources and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence management. Furthermore Cornett 
et.al (2007) noted that these institutional investors have a greater incentive to monitor the activities of 
management as they have more invested in the firm than other investors such retail investors, who may 
have little or no wealth invested in the firm. 
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On the other hand these large shareholders are also likely to maintain strategic alliances with 
management and may be swayed by the voting behaviour of management which could reduce their 
ability to effectively monitor the actions taken by management. At the same time it is possible that at 
higher levels of shareholding the institutional investors may be encouraged to make sub-optimal 
decisions that could be detrimental to the company’s performance. Another concern is whether all the 
investors have an incentive to actively monitor management. Some investors may be transient and only 
interested in short term profits. The fund managers of the large institutional firms are often only 
interested in short term profits as their bonuses may be based on the short-term returns they generate 
and thus they are less likely to play an active role in monitoring management activities (Salehi et al., 
2011). 
 
2.1.3 Family shareholders and performance 
A review of literature reveals that family ownership is a very common occurrence in both developed 
and emerging economies. Chen (2012) found that more than one third on the S&P 500 companies are 
owned by families. The studies that have been conducted examining the relationship between family 
ownership and company performance have found that family ownership is positively correlated to 
company performance. In explaining this relationship the incentive alignment argument was used. Since 
the family shareholders have a financial interest in the company they have an incentive to monitor and 
direct management’s decisions in order to ensure that the company is operated for the benefit of the 
shareholders.  
 
Other studies however have found a negative relationship between family ownership and performance. 
This negative relationship can be attributed to the entrenchment argument. The high number of shares 
held by the family shareholder creates an incentive for them to expropriate wealth from the minority 
shareholders (Iturrdalde, Maseda and Arosa, 2011). 
 
2.1.4 Government shareholders and performance 
The literature on government ownership and its impact on firm performance has been limited and thus 
far there has been no systematic pattern found between their shareholding and performance.  A review 
of literature reveals that there are two discernible strands of research that exist. The first strand proposes 
that government ownership has no positive impact on performance. This is due to the fact that the 
presence of government as a shareholder may result in inefficiencies in the running of the company as 
the state may have its own political or socio-economic goals and may use its control to divert the 
company’s resources to achieve these goals (Razak, Ahmad and Sivachandran, 2014). 
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Orden and Garmendia (2005) examined the relationship between ownership type and performance of 
firms in Spain.  As part of their study the ownership structure was analysed in terms of concentration 
with performance being measured by return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Their study 
revealed that government owned companies showed negative performance when compared to other 
ownership types. Zeitun and Tain (2007) while examining the impact of ownership structure on default 
risk, found that government ownership is significantly and negatively related to the performance of the 
firm based on the ROA and ROE. 
 
The second strand of research argues the opposite of the first strand. This strand of research focuses on 
the benefits that are associated with government being a shareholder.  The presence of government as 
a shareholder provides the company with opportunities to impact the regulatory policies and enhance 
the firm’s legitimacy. It allows the company to benefit from preferential treatment or gain access to 
valuable state controlled resources. With these kinds of connections the company may be able to 
enhance its performance ( Razak et al., 2014). 
 
In the context of South Africa, organizations such as the Government employees’ pension fund (GEPF) 
and the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) hold shares in a large number of listed companies. The 
GEPF provides its active members, who are primarily employees working in National and Provincial 
Government, with death, ill-health, retirement and withdrawal benefits. In order to achieve this, the 
GEPF invests the funds received through members’ contribution into various asset classes (both in 
South Africa and Africa) such as equities, properties, bonds and cash/money market instruments (GEPF, 
2015). 
 
Due to the size of its investments the GEPF has established various portfolios with separate mandates 
that are managed by various investment managers e.g. PIC. Even though the GEPF may not be directly 
invested in the companies themselves, they indirectly have the ability to influence the decisions of the 
company through their investment manager who is required to act in accordance with the fund mandate. 
Given the fact that the GEPF’s mandate encompasses a wide range of socio-economic goals, their 
presence could result in inefficiencies in the running of the company as pressure could be placed on 
management to pursue certain goals that may not necessarily result in profit maximization. This 
supports the first strand of research. However, given the nature of the GEPF it is likely that in most of 
their investments, the mandate will be more long-term focused as their main objective is to ensure that 
the employees and their dependents are taken care of, supporting the second strand of research (GEPF, 
2015). 
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Public Investment Corporation (PIC) 
The PIC is South Africa’s largest investment manager, with close to R1.8trillion worth of assets 
managed by them. The PIC is wholly owned by the South Africa government with the minister of 
finance as shareholder representative. The GEPF is the PIC’s largest client and accounts for 89% of the 
assets that the PIC manages. All of the investments that are managed by the PIC are directed by the 
detailed investment mandates that are negotiated with each individual client (PIC, 2015). 
 
The presence of the PIC as a shareholder in a company is likely to result in them being more concerned 
with the long term profitability of the company. This is due to the fact that much of their clients e.g. the 
GEPF, have investment mandates that are long term focused. And given the fact that the PIC is there to 
carry out these mandates, they too will have to encourage long-term profit maximization, supporting 
the second strand (PIC, 2015; GEPF, 2015). 
 
2.1.5 Foreign shareholders and performance 
With the increase in globalization the importance of multi-national enterprises (MNE) and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) has increased significantly (Swart, 2013). 
FDI is defined as a long term investment that is made by an investor in a value-adding activity that is 
outside the investor’s country of origin. This investment can take place in one of two forms. The first 
is institutional investment or portfolio investment. This is where the investor doesn’t gain control over 
the entity but either has shares or has an investment in the shares of the foreign entity that were acquired 
on behalf of the investor by an investment fund. The second investment is a corporate investment where 
the investor goes on to take partial or full control over the foreign entity with the intention of adding 
value (Swart, 2013). 
According to FDI and foreign ownership theory, foreign-owned firms have a performance advantage 
over local firms. It is postulated that the increased performance arises due to the fact that these foreign-
owned companies have access to superior technology, organisational improvements and potentially 
have increased access to foreign markets (Swart, 2013). 
Uwalomwa and Olamide (2012) investigated the impact of foreign ownership on profitability (using 
ROA as a performance measure) on 31 Nigerian listed firms from 2006-2010. The investigation found 
that foreign ownership had a significantly positive influence on the company’s performance. They 
attributed this positive relationship to the fact that the foreign owner brought with them improved 
managerial skills and technology (Uwuigbe and Olusanmi, 2012). 
While this study attributed the positive influence to managerial efficiencies and new resources, 
Ongore (2011) found that the positive relationship was also as a result of ability of the foreign firms to 
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leverage their global operations to assign their cost and expenses to high tax regimes and profits to low 
tax regimes (Ongore, 2011). 
There has also been empirical work showing that a negative or indifferent relationship exists between 
performance and foreign ownership. Jiang (2007) studied the effect of foreign ownership on the 
performance of Chinese listed companies between 2000 and 2004. The study revealed that no 
relationship existed between foreign ownership and firm performance in the Chinese context. However 
in the study the researcher postulated that the reason for this was that the foreign owners have rights to 
assets but have limited or no voting rights over strategic issues (Jiang, 2007). 
Aitken and Harrison (1999) used a data set of 43 010 observations covering companies in Venezuela in 
the period 1976-1986. Their study revealed that there was no evidence to support the spill over of 
technology from foreign-owned firms to domestic-owned firms that would improve company 
performance (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). 
Konings (2000) tested the effects of FDI on the performance of firms in Bulgaria, Romania and Poland. 
The results of the study showed that foreign firms in Poland performed better than domestic companies 
(Konings, 2000). 
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Chapter 3 
 
3.1 Hypotheses development 
 
In this section we will look to develop relevant hypothesis for the identified groups of shareholders 
noted in the literature review in chapter 2. 
 
3.1.1 Managerial shareholders 
 
In Thailand, the relationship between managerial shareholders and firm performance (with ROA used 
as a performance measure) was studied by Wiwattanakantung (2001). The study made a distinction 
between managerial shareholders (those who hold more than 25% of the shares) and non-managerial 
controlling shareholders (those who hold less than 25% of the shares). The study found that firms with 
managerial shareholders have a poorer ROA compared to firms with non-managerial controlling 
shareholders (Wiwattanakantang, 2001). 
Lei and Song (2008) explored the relationship between management ownership and firm performance. 
Using the panel data of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2004 the results showed that the percentage 
of shares held by top management was positively and significantly related to firm performance. 
Thus based on the above the researcher expects that at low levels of managerial shareholding there will 
be a positive relationship between performance and managerial shareholding, as management's 
ownership helps resolve the agency problems and improve the firm's performance. However as the 
shareholding of the management increases the performance of the company will decrease. 
Hypothesis 
Performance is positively related to managerial shareholding. 
 
3.1.2 Institutional investors 
As mentioned in the literature review institutional investors play an integral part of corporate ownership 
and have a special influence on the performance of a company. In a study conducted by Abbas, Naqvi 
and Mirza (2013) they found that performance (measured by ROE and ROA) was positively related to 
institutional investor’s shareholding, when their shareholding exceeded 10%. This was attributed to the 
efficient monitoring performed by the institutional investors. However it was also found that when the 
shareholding was beyond the level required for control, a negative relationship was found as a result of 
the expropriation of resources and exploitation of minority shareholders by the investors (Sarkar and 
Sarkar, 2000). 
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Accordingly the researcher expects that at low levels of shareholding firm performance will increase 
and at higher levels of shareholding we expect that firm performance will decrease. 
Hypothesis 
Performance is positively related to institutional investors’ shareholding 
 
3.1.3 Family shareholders 
Goh, Rasli, and Rehman (2014) conducted a study to examine the economic incentives of family 
controlling shareholders and the monitoring role that non-dominant shareholders played in family firms. 
The results of the study suggest that the presence of family shareholders is not necessarily detrimental 
to the performance of the firm, as the company can gain access to more resources in wider business 
networks. However, the more the shares held, the greater the incentive for the family shareholder to 
expropriate wealth for their own benefit, which in turns harms the performance of the firm. This 
phenomenon was observed through an inverted U-shaped relationship between control rights and firm 
performance (Goh et al., 2014). 
 
Rajput and Joshi (2014) in their investigation of the effects of ownership structure on firm performance 
(using a sample of companies from India) found that family owned firms have a positive and significant 
impact on the financial performance of the company. The incentive alignment was used by the 
researchers to explain the positive relationship (Rajput and Joshi, 2014). 
 
Thus based on the above the researcher expects that there will be a positive relationship between family 
shareholding and performance. 
 
Hypothesis 
Performance is positively related to family shareholding 
 
 
3.1.4 Government shareholders 
 
The PIC is the largest state-owned company in South Africa and yields a considerable amount of power. 
As previously mentioned their investment mandate is driven by the individual mandates of the clients 
they service. Since their clients are focused on achieving long-term returns it is likely that the PIC as a 
shareholder would advocate that long-term profit maximizing decisions be taken. Furthermore given 
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the nature of their clients the PIC is also likely to assume a monitoring role in order to ensure that 
decisions taken by management do not destroy shareholder value. (PIC, 2015) 
 
Thus the researcher predicts that there will a positive relationship between government shareholding 
and company performance. 
Hypothesis 
Performance is positively related to government shareholding 
 
3.1.5 Foreign shareholders  
 
As previously mentioned many studies have empirically shown the benefits of FDI, however there has 
been no definitive answer as to whether the proposed theory is correct. The reason for these opposing 
views has been attributed to the fact that each country/economy is different, and as a result companies 
may react differently to the presence of foreign owners, therefore the results need to be interpreted in 
the context of the specific circumstances in that economy/country (Swart, 2013).  
 
In a study conducted by Swart (2013), the researcher looked to determine whether foreign-owned firms 
performed better than locally owned firms in South Africa. Using ROA and ROE as performance the 
study revealed that there was no significant difference between the performance of foreign-owned firms 
and locally owned firms (Swart, 2013). 
The findings of Swart (2013) were in line with that of Mihai (2012) who investigated the effect of 
foreign ownership on a sample of Romanian firms and found that there was no difference between 
performance of local and foreign owned firms. 
Although the results of Swart (2013) are in line with the Mihai (2012), the results contradict many of 
the results from other studies that show a more positive financial performance for foreign-owned firms 
(Swart, 2013). One of the reason the FDI theory does not hold in the context of South Africa could be 
that the technological and management gap between the investor’s country of origin and South Africa 
is too large to facilitate any transfer of benefits to the local firms (Swart, 2013). 
Thus based on the above the researcher expects there to be no relationship between foreign ownership 
and performance.  
Hypothesis 
Performance is not related to foreign ownership 
17 
 
Chapter 4 
 
4.1 Methodology 
In order to test the stated hypotheses the researcher examined all the companies listed on the JSE. The 
secondary data required for the study was primarily obtained from the McGregor BFA, JSE and OSIRIS 
financial database. The data used in the study consists of all basic material, industrial, consumer goods, 
consumer services, healthcare, oil & gas, technology, utilities and telecommunications companies listed 
on the JSE main board for which the historical shareholding patterns for the period of the study could 
be obtained. The benefit of having used the secondary data was that the data was readily available at a 
low cost. Where the data was not in the correct form for the research the data was re-worked to obtain 
the required ratios and information. 
The study excludes companies where the data was missing for the period of the research. Furthermore 
companies that were not listed for the entire period of research have also been excluded. The final 
dataset for the study included, in total, 151 companies belonging to nine industries as depicted in Table 
1 below:  
Table 1: Summary of sample companies by industry 
Industry No. of companies Percentage (%) 
Basic materials(BM) 28 19.58 
Industrial(Ind) 31 21.68 
Financial(Fin) 30 20.98 
Consumer Goods(CG) 13 9.10 
Consumer Services(CS) 28 19.58 
Technology(Tech) 8 5.59 
Telecommunications(Tele) 2 1.40 
Oil and gas(O&G) 1 0.69 
Healthcare(Health) 2 1.40 
Utilities(Utilities) 0 0 
Total 143 100% 
 
 
4.2 Dependent and Independent Variables 
4.2.1 Dependent variables  
The most commonly used performance measures are either accounting measures such as ROE and ROA 
or market based measures such as Tobin Q. Accounting measures generally reflect the historical 
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performance of the company, whereas market related measures capture the expected future performance 
of the company (Haldar and Rao, 2011). 
 
Tobins Q is the most commonly used market based measure and is calculated as the market value of 
the firm over its replacement cost. While Tobins Q is a widely accepted proxy for firm valuation and 
performance, it has its disadvantages. Hu and Izumida (2009) argued that the Q( being the market value 
of the firm) distorts the ability of the researcher to compare the performance of firms with different 
intangible assets as the figure partly reflects a firms intangible assets whereas the denominator only 
includes the firm’s tangible assets. Furthermore determining the replacement cost can be a strenuous 
task and as a result some studies have substituted the replacement cost with the depreciated book value, 
which in itself is an accounting measure and suffers the same disadvantages as any other accounting 
measures that one may choose to employ (Hu and Izumida, 2009). 
 
This study made use of accounting measures as proxies for company performance. Much like Tobin Q, 
accounting measures also have their advantages and disadvantages. Many researchers argue that 
accounting information only reflects short-term profitability and does not necessarily reflect the agency 
cost or the long-term returns, however both ROA and ROE are appropriate measures as they are not 
influenced by the market nor are the fluctuations in the market absorbed in the measures. Secondly 
these measures are a reflection of the performance of the company in that year and thus cannot 
necessarily be reflective of past or future performance (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000). 
 
The accounting measures present the outcome of management action and thus preferred over a market 
based measure such as Tobin Q as changes in the market value of a company are not always in control 
of management and often changes in market value are driven by sentiment and not actually due to a 
change in the underlying fundamentals of the company. Based on the underlying theory that was 
outlined in the literature review it was identified that the company shareholders can influence the 
decisions that are taken by management (e.g. Government shareholders asking the company to invest 
various government projects instead of profit maximising activities). One of the ways in which the 
impact of these decisions can be evaluated is through the use of accounting measures, as these measures 
often reflect the outcome of those decisions taken. Since the purpose of the study is to understand how 
ownership structure affects company performance it is appropriate to make use of ROA and ROE as 
measures of performance (Al-Matari, Al-Swidi and Fadzil, 2014). 
 
For the purpose of the study, ROA and ROE have been calculated as follows:  
 
Return on assets: 
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𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥(𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)−𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠−𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
                         ………equation [1] 
 
Return on equity:  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
                                                                                               ………..equation [2] 
 
Extraordinary profits are defined as gains or losses in the financial statements of the company which 
are infrequent and unusual in nature. These have been removed from the EBIT in order to get to a 
normalized profit figure. 
 
4.2.2 Independent variables 
As mentioned in the literature review, there are five types of shareholders that past studies have 
identified as having an impact on performance. The five ownership variables that have been used in the 
study are as follows: 
 
 Managerial shareholding 
 Institutional investors shareholding 
 Government shareholding 
 Family shareholding 
 Foreign shareholding 
 
For this study shareholding will be measured as the percentage of the issued share capital held by that 
shareholder. This information will be obtained from the various financial databases mentioned above. 
 
Managerial shareholding 
For the purpose of determining the percentage of shares held by managers the percentage of shares held 
by directors has been used as a proxy. 
 
Government shareholding 
In determining the government shareholding the percentage of shares held by the PIC and GEPF were 
included. We have also identified and included the percentage of shares held by local and provincial 
branches of government as well Municipalities’. Furthermore the percentage of shares held by state 
owned enterprises such as Transnet, SABC, Eskom, Prasa and the Industrial development Corporation 
(IDC) were included as part of the percentage of shares held by government. 
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Family shareholding  
Much like BEE shareholders it was difficult to identify which of the shareholders were in fact family 
shareholders. On the McGregor BFA database it provides information regarding various categories of 
shareholders, one of them being trusts. Many of these trusts are in fact family trusts that hold shares in 
the company. Therefore for the purpose of this study the researcher has assumed that percentage of 
shares held by the trust represent the percentage of shares held by family shareholders. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
 
Apart from ownership structure there are a number of other variables that may impact company 
performance. These variables have been included as control variables and were selected with reference 
to prior empirical studies into the topic. 
 
4.3.1 Age of firm 
Age of firm is defined as the number of years that the company has been listed on the JSE. The 
performance of a company may be dependent on the accumulated knowledge about the market; 
experience and the reputation of the company. As a result one would expect a positive relationship 
between the age of the company and its profit margins. The age of the firm controls for life-cycle effects 
as the profits of older companies may be enhanced due to reputation-building; learning; experience and 
knowledge (Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000 ; Driffield, Mahambare and Pal, 2005). 
 
4.3.2 Size of the firm 
 
Size of firm is defined as average sales over a 3 year period. Large companies may exercise economies 
of scale, have better knowledge of the markets, all of which can improve the performance of the 
company (Driffield et al., 2005). Thus we have included standardized sales as a control variable to 
control for the impact that size may have on performance. Many of the companies listed on the JSE 
publish their financial results in a currency other than Rands. For those companies the turnover/sales 
figures were translated into Rands using the average exchange rate for their financial year. The average 
exchange rate was calculated by taking the sum of the spot rates at the end of each month during the 
relevant financial year and finding the average of those spot rates. The exchange rates used were 
obtained from Global financial Data. This is consistent with the financial reporting guidelines that are 
provided in IAS 21. 
 
4.3.3 Leverage 
Leverage is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to total equity. The increase of debt financing by the 
company increases the pressure on management to perform as it reduces the moral hazard behaviour by 
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reducing the free cash-flow at the disposal of the management. As a result firms with high levels of debt 
are more inclined to improve their performance. On the other side the high level of debts gives rise to 
higher agency cost as the shareholders and debtholders interest begin to diverge, resulting in company 
profits being negatively impacted. Given this, the study will use leverage as a control variable due to 
its potential impact on a company’s performance (Weill, 2003). 
For the purpose of the study, debt equity has been calculated as follows:  
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙+𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
                                                               ……..equation [3] 
4.3.4 Dummy year 
 
A dummy year has been is included in order to control for various macroeconomic events that may 
affect all companies (Grosfeld, 2006). 
 
4.3.5 Industry 
 
Given the fact that companies from the various industries will have different levels of performance, an 
indicator variable will be used to control for this. The companies used in the study will be categorized 
into their respective industries. Where a company falls within a specific industry the value of 1 will be 
given to that company for that industry and a value of 0 will be given to each of the other industries that 
the company does not fall into. The categories of industry used will be those per the JSE mainboard that 
have been derived from the Industry Classification Benchmark. The inclusion of the industry dummy 
variable will also account for cyclicality within certain industries. Furthermore as part of our research 
we have specifically excluded banking companies. This is due to the fact that banks businesses model 
is heavily dependent on their capital structure. Thus their debt/equity ratio is likely to have a greater 
impact on performance as a bank’s performance is linked to the debt that they have in their financial 
statements. 
 
4.4 Model Specification 
The study adopts a panel data regression model which incorporates all company data over the period 
2004-2014 into a single model. The model can extract relationships across time and between different 
companies. With regards to this methodology there are two models that can be used, namely the fixed 
effects model and random effects model. In terms of deciding which of the models would be chosen, a 
Hausman test was run. This test enabled the researcher to determine which of the models would be more 
efficient and more consistent in terms of the results that are generated. The software program that was 
used to run the model was Stata. 
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This leads to the estimation of the following equation: 
ROAit = α + βit(Manhold)it + βit(Instihold)it +βit (Forhold)it + βit(Govhold)it+ βit(Famhold)it+ 
ΣNit(IndicatorVariable)It+ ΣNit(ControlVariable)it  + Ԑit                                                       ……………equation [4] 
 
ROEit = α + βit(Manhold)it +βit(Instihold)it +βit(Forhold)it + βit(Govhold)it + βit(Famhold)it+ 
ΣNit(IndicatorVariable)it+ ΣNit(ControlVariable)it  + Ԑit                                                ……………equation [5] 
 
Where 
i denotes the company with i=151 
t denote the time period. The yearly observations are from 2004-2014. 
ROA= Average Return on Assets 
ROE=Average Return on Equity 
Ԑ = Standard Error term 
α is the constant  
β is the coefficient for independent variable 
 
The following are the ownership variables: 
Manhold= Managerial shareholding 
Instihold= Institutional investor’s shareholding 
Forhold= Foreign shareholding 
Govhold= Government shareholding 
Famhold= Family shareholding 
 
And the following are the control variables: 
Average Sales= Size of firm 
Average DE= Leverage 
Years= No of years listed on JSE 
 
For indicator variables please refer to Table 1 
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Chapter 5 
 
The objective of this study is to understand whether the ownership structure of JSE listed companies 
affects the performance. In order to do this, the performance and ownership structure of JSE listed 
companies over the period 2004 to 2014 was analysed. The performance measures used in the study 
were ROA and ROE. Based on the review of prior literature and availability of information five 
categories of shareholders where identified, namely managerial shareholders, institutional investor’s, 
government shareholders, foreign shareholders and family shareholders. 
 
The first part of this chapter reports on the descriptive statistics of both the dependent and independent 
variables for the sample over the period under consideration. The second part of the chapter highlights 
the results of the panel data regression analysis that was used to identify the effect of ownership on the 
performance of JSE listed companies. 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics analysis 
Table 2 below contains mean, median, standard deviation and max and min for each variables used in 
the study. 
Table 2: Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Variable standard 
deviation 
min max mean 
De 116,24986 0,0242 9,7500 2,3092 
Roa 59,7586 -246,6512 24,1806 9,4774 
Roe 72,5821 -60,3611 18,5581 15,2682 
manhold 83,4518 0,0036 18,6388 14,5823 
instihold 91,4148 2,3976 20,9063 48,2312 
forhold 69,7128 0 13,2536 11,83450 
govhold 23,7622 0 5,9910 7,2755 
famhold 66,3655 0,0618 8,8977 6,1142 
Sales 363977522,6 -8657,5757 43507435 19965053 
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years 112,8182 4,500 22,1493 28,5019 
 
The results of the descriptive statistics presented in table 2 reveal that the average percentage held by 
managers, institutional investors, foreign shareholders, government shareholders and family 
shareholders was 14.58%; 48,23%; 11.83%; 7.27% and 6.11% respectively. The above table highlights 
that on average a large number of the shares in a company are held by institutional investors. A further 
analysis was done looking at the average shareholding in each of the various industries. Figures 3.1-
3.9(found in the appendix) shows the average shareholder mix for the period under review for each of 
the various industries. These graphs show that on average your institutional investors hold close to 50% 
of the shares.  
 
Further analysis (as presented in figure 1) reveals that on average companies in the Industrial sector 
have the highest debt-equity ratio, while companies in the consumer goods industry have the lowest 
debt-equity ratio. Looking at ROA and ROE (figure 2), it can be seen that over the period under review 
the companies operating within the industrial sector have performed better than their peers. 
 
Figure 1: Average Debt equity ratio for the period (2004-2014) 
 
 
Figure 2: Average ROA and ROE for the Period: 2004-2014 
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Figure 3: Shareholder composition for the period 2004-2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Multicollinearity 
This study assessed for the risk of multicollinearity by inspecting the correlation between variables to 
identify large correlations. Multicollinearity could largely influence the model that is used. To evaluate 
the possible degree of collinearity among variables the correlation matrix of the variables is examined 
and presented in Table 3 below: 
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Table 3: Cross-sectional analysis – correlation matrix 
 
 
de roa roe manhold instihold forhold govhold famhold sales years 
de 1 -0,0074 -0,1499 -0,0276 0,0380 -0,0151 0,0866 -0,0232 -0,0176 -0,0308 
roa -0,0074 1 0,2791 0,0124 -0,0450 0,0150 0,0454 -0,0221 0,0288 -0,0518 
roe -0,1499 0,2791 1 0,0164 0,0159 -0,0509 -0,0190 0,0571 0,0186 -0,0888 
manhold -0,0276 0,0124 0,0164 1 -0,4559 -0,2238 -0,4120 0,2708 -0,1724 -0,0526 
instihold 0,0380 -0,0450 0,0159 -0,4560 1 -0,3184 0,0087 -0,2638 0,0222 0,0309 
forhold -0,0151 0,0150 -0,0509 -0,2238 -0,3184 1 0,2990 -0,1634 0,2103 0,2406 
govhold 0,0866 0,0454 -0,0190 -0,4120 0,0087 0,2989 1 -0,2323 0,1880 -0,0235 
sales -0,0232 -0,0221 0,0571 0,2708 -0,2638 -0,1634 -0,2323 1 -0,1522 0,0022 
years -0,0176 0,0288 0,0186 -0,1724 0,0222 0,2103 0,1880 -0,1522 1 0,0292 
 
The results noted in table 3 from the correlation matrix reveal that majority of the variable correlations 
are generally moderate with absolute values less than 0.45. Thus the correlation matrix suggests that 
there is no significant evidence of multicollinearity. 
 
Normality 
Using the Shapiro-Wilk W test, the data collected was tested for normality. The results of the test reveal 
that the data is not normally distributed however, this is not a concern as the regression model is robust. 
 
5.2 Analysis of Results 
 
The use of either the fixed effects model or the random effects model hinges on whether the cross 
section specific error component is correlated with any of the explanatory variable (Independent 
variables). If there is a correlation then the use of the random effects model would be inappropriate, and 
thus the fixed effects model would be used instead. As mentioned above the Hausman test would need 
to be run to determine which of the two models would be used. The Hausmen test determines whether 
the unique error terms are correlated to the explanatory variables. For the purpose of this study a 
Hausment test was run for independent variables and ROA and then for independent variables and ROE. 
 
 
 
 
 
27 
 
Table 4: Results of the Hausman Test 
Variable Hausman-ROA Hausman-ROE    
de 0,04958858 -.16989419** 
manhold -0,03916018 -0,04124834 
instihold -.17846683** 0,03682951 
forhold -0,12484403 -.15579842* 
govhold -0,05047738 -0,07726316 
famhold -0,13762769 0,15379198 
stdsales -.23899427*** -0,08199983 
bm -15,785275 -15,183878 
cg 1,8697467 -4,6088532 
cs 0,27251503 7,0906614 
fin -14,711197 -10,825979 
health -6,8919601 -21,174218 
ind -5,9539247 -4,7597584 
og -42,576076 -60.062161** 
tech -8,7582778 -4,6184294 
utility (omitted) (omitted) 
tele (omitted) (omitted) 
_cons 36.178096* 24.579248*  
  
chi2 36,783417 71,959361 
p 0,001361 0,000000001995    
 
 
The results of the Hausment test, as noted in Table 4, reveal that for ROA and ROE the p-value was 
significantly less than 0.05, thus the fixed effects model was used. 
 
Heteroscedasticity 
With regard to heteroscedasticity, Letsoenya and Negash (2013) note that this occurs when the 
calculated error variance correlates with the values of independent variable, thus affecting statistical 
inference.  A test for heteroscedasticity indicated that the errors were homoscedastic. 
 
Table 4.1: Heteroscedasticity-consistent regression 
 ROA  ROE  
 Coef./t s.e. Coef./t s.e. 
DE -0.08 0.07 0.06 0.10 
 (-1.14)  (0.58)  
Manhold -0.03 0.07 -0.04 0.05 
 (-0.46)  (-0.92)  
Instihold 0.00 0.07 -0.26 0.24 
 (0.06)  (-1.08)  
Forhold -0.26** 0.10 -0.18 0.14 
 (-2.65)  (-1.29)  
Govhold -0.24 0.18 -0.23 0.13 
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 (-1.38)  (-1.69)  
Famhold 0.38** 0.14 -0.10 0.23 
 (2.66)  (-0.44)  
sales -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 (-0.31)  (0.87)  
Years -0.01 0.09 -0.43 0.38 
 (-0.11)  (-1.15)  
BM 27.19 37.99 24.50*** 4.74 
 (0.72)  (5.16)  
CG 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
CS 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Fin 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Health 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Ind 13.20 26.74 19.72*** 4.18 
 (0.49)  (4.72)  
O&G 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Tech 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Utility 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Tele 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Constant 10.38 13.54 29.84 24.33 
 (0.77)  (1.23)  
Observations 1,548***  1,548  
Groups 143  143  
F-stat 2.6  .  
Prob>F 0.00  .  
R2 within -0.61  -0.54  
R2 between 0.02  0.03  
R2 overall 0.04  0.01  
Corr (ei , Xb) 0.01  0.00  
rho=Corr (eit , eis) 0.47  0.53  
Sigma_u 23.62  29.31  
Sigma_e 25.27  27.73  
Root mean SE 25.27  26.42  
t statistics in parentheses; s.e. – standard error corrected for heteroscedasticity 
Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Results of the panel data regression  
The model summaries of the panel data regression output indicate the following regarding ROA; ROE 
and ownership structure. 
 
Table 5: Panel regression data 
 ROA  ROE  
 coef./t s.e. coef./t s.e. 
DE 0.06 0.07 -0.08 0.07 
 (0.76)  (-1.14)  
Manhold -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.07 
 (-0.57)  (-0.46)  
Instihold -0.26*** 0.07 0.00 0.07 
 (-3.57)  (0.06)  
Forhold -0.18 0.11 -0.26** 0.10 
 (-1.63)  (-2.65)  
Govhold -0.23 0.19 -0.24 0.18 
 (-1.17)  (-1.38)  
Famhold -0.10 0.16 0.38** 0.14 
 (-0.65)  (2.66)  
sales 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 
 (0.41)  (-0.31)  
Years -0.43*** 0.09 -0.01 0.09 
 (-4.59)  (-0.11)  
BM 24.50 41.68 27.19 37.99 
 (0.59)  (0.72)  
CG 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
CS 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Fin 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Health 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Ind 19.72 29.34 13.20 26.74 
 (0.67)  (0.49)  
O&G 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Tech 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Utility 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Tele 0.00 . 0.00 . 
 (.)  (.)  
Constant 29.84* 14.85 10.38 13.54 
 (2.01)  (0.77)  
Observations 1,548***  1,548***  
Groups 143  143  
F-stat 4  2.6  
Prob>F 0.00  0.00  
R2 within -0.54  -0.61  
R2 between 0.03  0.02  
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R2 overall 0.01  0.04  
Corr (ei , Xb) 0.00  0.01  
rho=Corr (eit , eis) 0.53  0.47  
Sigma_u 29.31  23.62  
Sigma_e 27.73  25.27  
Root mean SE 27.73  25.27  
t statistics in parentheses; s.e. – standard error corrected for heteroscedasticity 
Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Ownership structure and ROA 
 
The results in table 5 reveal that there is a significant negative relationship between managerial 
shareholding and ROA as p-value is less than 0.05. However there is an insignificant relationship 
between family shareholding, institutional investor’s shareholding and foreign shareholding and ROA 
as the p-values of the respective variables are greater than 0.05 
 
Ownership structure and ROE 
The result of regression (as presented in table 5) between ownership structure and ROE reveals that 
there is a significant negative relationship between managerial shareholding and ROE, as the p-value  
is less than 0.05 and that there is a significant positive relationship between institutional shareholding 
and ROE as the p-value is also below 0.05. However there is an insignificant relationship between 
family shareholding, foreign shareholding and government shareholdings and ROE as the p-values of 
the respective variables are greater than 0.05. 
 
5.3 Discussion of findings 
 
Managerial shareholding and performance 
The results of the regression analysis reveal that there is a significant negative relationship between 
ROA and managerial holding and ROE and managerial shareholding.  
 
A previous study by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) has shown that when management held between 
5% and 25% of the shares a negative relationship between ownership and performance was found. The 
researchers concluded that the negative relationship was as a result of managers becoming complacent 
and no-longer putting in the required amount of effort to ensure the continued growth of the firm. In 
explaining the negative relationship found when managerial shareholding was between 5% and 25%, 
the researcher’s also used the entrenchment argument. The entrenchment argument states that as the 
number of shares held by management increases there is a decrease in performance. The managers in 
the firm become so powerful that they no longer need to consider the other shareholders. As a result of 
having greater power, they have greater freedom to pursue their own interests. The managers are able 
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to divert funds away from the company through theft; dilution of outside investor interest by issuing 
shares; paying themselves excessive salaries or even selling of assets to themselves or other firms which 
they control at favourable prices (Scholten 2014). Therefore the results of the regression are in line with 
the study that was conducted by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), indicating that perhaps 
management holding more shares in the company does not have the intended outcome of improving 
performance.Therefore based on the above data, we reject the hypotheses that performance is positively 
related to managerial shareholding. 
 
 
Institutional investors’ shareholding and performance  
The results of the study reveal two different sets of information. There is an insignificant relationship 
between ROA and institutional investors’ shareholding. However for the relationship between ROE and 
institutional investors’ shareholding a positive relationship was found. As previously mentioned, it is 
the institutional investors who are more efficient at monitoring the actions of management as they 
generally have the resources and ability to monitor, discipline, and influence management.  These 
results show that by having such capabilities they are able to influence the operations of the entity and 
thus directly affect the performance. Therefore, we accept the hypotheses that performance is positively 
related to institutional investors’ shareholding. 
 
Foreign shareholding and performance 
The results of the regression analysis reveal that there is an insignificant relationship that exists between 
ROA and foreign shareholding and ROE and foreign shareholding. These results are in line with a 
previous study conducted by Swart (2013) who looked to determine whether foreign-owned firms 
performed better than locally owned firms in South Africa. The findings of his study showed no 
significant difference between the performance of foreign-owned firms and locally owned firms 
indicating that having foreign owners does not significantly affect the performance of the company. 
The results of our study also show that foreign shareholders do not have a significant influence on both 
ROA and ROE.  Therefore, we accept the hypothesis that performance is not related to foreign 
ownership. A reason for this could be that the technological and management gap between the investor’s 
country of origin and South Africa is too large to facilitate any transfer of benefits to the local firms. 
 
Family shareholding and performance 
The results reveal that there is an insignificant relationship that exists between family shareholders and 
both ROA and ROE. These results are not consistent with the results that were found by Goh, Rasli, 
and Rehman (2014), who noted that the presence of family shareholders is not necessarily detrimental 
to the performance of the firm. Nor are the results consistent with studies that found a negative 
relationship between family ownership and performance (Iturrdalde, Maseda and Arosa, 2011). 
32 
 
 
As noted in table 2  there average shareholding associated with family shareholders was  6.11% which 
is significantlly less that the percentage held by other catergories of shareholders. Therefore given there 
smaller shareholding it can be said that in the context of South Africa these shareholders may not have 
sufficient ability able to influence the performance of the company. Thus based on the above the 
researcher rejects the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between family shareholding and 
performance. 
 
Government shareholding and performance 
The results of the regression analysis reveal that there is an insignificant relationship that exists between 
ROA and government shareholding and ROE and government shareholding 
 
As mentioned there are two discernible strands of research that exist. The first strand proposes that 
government ownership has no positive impact on performance, as government shareholders may use 
their control to divert company resources to achieve their own political or socio-economic goals. The 
second strand focuses on the benefits that are associated with government being a shareholder. The 
results of the regression analysis do not support the above mentioned strands of research. As noted in 
table 2 it was found that the average percentage of shares held by government was 7.28%. Which is 
less than the shareholding of both management and institutional investors who were found to have an 
influence on performance.  Therefore given their smaller shareholding it is likely that government 
shareholders are not able to influence the operations of the company, and thus there is no benefit that 
the company derives as noted in second strand of research, nor is there diversion of company resources 
to achieve political or socio-economic goals that will result in the company performing badly. Therefore 
we reject the hypothesis that performance is positively related to government shareholding 
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Chapter 6 
 
6.1 Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study was to understand weather the ownership structure of JSE listed companies 
affects the performance of those companies. In order to understand this relationship the study applied a 
panel data regression model to various measures of performance namely ROA and ROE and five 
ownership variables namely, managerial shareholding, institutional investor’s shareholding, foreign 
shareholding, family shareholding and government shareholding. The study examined 143 companies 
over the period 2004-2014. 
 
The results of the study reveal that of the five different categories of shareholders identified it was only 
managerial shareholders and institutional shareholders that had a significant impact on a company’s 
performance.  This supports the main point under the entrenchment argument. Under this argument as 
the number of shares held by management increases there is a decrease in company performance. As a 
result of having greater power, they have greater freedom to pursue their own interests. The managers 
are able to divert funds away from the company through theft; dilution of outside investor interest by 
issuing shares; paying themselves excessive salaries or even selling of assets to themselves or other 
firms which they control at favourable prices. For institutional investors their resources and ability to 
monitor, discipline, and influence management makes them more suited to influence the performance 
of the company. 
 
Family shareholders and government shareholders were found to have an insignificant impact on the 
performance of the company. As noted in table 2  the average shareholding associated with family 
shareholders in 6.11% and government shareholding of 7.23%  both of which are significantlly less that 
the percentage held by other catergories of shareholders. Therefore given their smaller shareholding it 
can be said that they may not be able to influence the performance of the company. 
 
With regards to foreign shareholders, the results show that foreign shareholders had no significant 
impact on performance. This is in line with the evidence found by Swart (2013), that technological and 
management gap between the investor’s country of origin and South Africa is too large to facilitate any 
transfer of benefits to the local firms. 
 
Overall, based on the results obtained, the study has provided us with insight as to how ownership 
structure affects the performance of the company. While the results are not consistent with prior 
research in the topic, the results do indicate that the roles played by these shareholders in South Africa 
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may be different to those played by similar shareholders around the world, thus prompting further 
research to understand these roles and the impact on performance. 
 
6.2 Areas for Further research 
An area of further research would be to look into what role these categories of shareholders play in the 
company and potentially assess whether there are any differences or similarities between what is being 
done by the same shareholders in other parts of the world. 
A significant limitation of the study has been the lack of information regarding BEE shareholders.  The 
mid-2000s saw a significant increase in BEE ownership of many JSE-listed companies. Thus an area 
for further research would be to look at how the BEE shareholders impact the performance of the 
investee company. Furthermore the dimensions of the current study could be broadened to include other 
ownership variables such as nominee companies, retail/private investors and evaluate whether they have 
any impact on performance of the company.  
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Appendix  
 
 
Figure 3: Average Shareholder composition per industry (for the period 2004-2014) 
 
Figure 3.1: Average Shareholder composition-Basic Material (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Average Shareholder composition-Industrial (%) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Average Shareholder composition-Financial (%) 
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Figure 3.4: Average Shareholder composition-Consumer goods (%) 
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Figure 3.5: Average Shareholder composition-Consumer Services (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Average Shareholder composition-Healthcare (%) 
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Figure 3.7: Average Shareholder composition- Telecommunications (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Average Shareholder composition-Oil and gas (%) 
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Figure 3.9: Average Shareholder composition- Technology (%) 
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